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BANKRUPTCY LAW
BANK'S RIGHT OF SEr-oFF UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
New Jersey National Bank v. Gutterman (In re Applied Logic
Corp.)
Section 68a of the Bankruptcy Act provides that where "mu-
tual debts or credits [exist] between the estate of a bankrupt and
a creditor . . . one debt shall be set off against the other, and the
balance only shall be allowed or paid."' Under section 68a,2 a bank
Bankruptcy Act § 68, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1976), provides:
(a). In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bank-
rupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against
the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid.
(b). A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor of the
bankrupt which (1) is not provable against the estate and allowable under subdivi-
sion (g) of section 93 of this title [section 57 of the Act]; or (2) was purchased by
or transferred to him after the filing of the petition or within four months before
such filing, with a view to such use and with knowledge or notice that such bank-
rupt was insolvent or had committed an act of bankruptcy.
The requirement of an "account stated" is satisfied by the existence of "an agreement
between the parties to an account based upon prior transactions between them." Dwyer v.
Franklin (In re Majestic Radio and Tel. Corp.), 227 F.2d 152, 157 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 995 (1956) (quoting 1 AM. Jura. Accounts and Accounting § 16 (1938)). The
"mutuality" requirement is met when "the debts or credits [are] in the same right and
between the same parties, standing in the same capacity." 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 68.04
[2.11 (14th ed. 1978); accord, 3 H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1443 (rev. ed. J. Henderson 1956); see Baruch Inv. Co. v. Danning, 521 F.2d
186, 190 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Alfar Dairy, Inc., 458 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1248 (1972). The "allowability" requirement is embodied in § 57g of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 93(g) (1976), which provides that a creditor's claims against the bankrupt's estate
are "allowed" only when any preferences received or acquired by the creditor are surrendered.
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); see 4 W. COLLIER, supra, 68.08; 2 H. REMINGTON,
supra, § 762. Finally, § 57 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1976), sets forth detailed requirements
and procedures concerning the "provability" of claims. Generally, a claim must be "provable
in its nature at the time when the set-off is claimed, not provable in the pending bankruptcy
proceedings." Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass. 350, 351, 59 N.E. 1037, 1038 (1901). For addi-
tional background material concerning statutory set-off, see Otte v. United States, 419 U.S.
43, 54-55 (1974); Sun Basin Lumber Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1970); Wilson
v. Hy-Lan Furniture Co., 332 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 946
(1964); In re Tyner, 301 F. Supp. 1234 (M.D. Ga. 1969). See generally 4 W. COLLIER, supra,
68; D. COWANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 501 (2d ed. 1978); 1 LAWYERS CO-OPERATIVE,
MODERN BANKRUPTCY MANUAL §§ 509-527 (1966); 3 H. REMINGTON, supra, §§ 1431-1487.
The right of set-off described in the statute should be distinguished from the analogous
devices of recoupment and counterclaim. A set-off ordinarily involves mutual debts or credits
arising from different transactions and is utilized to reduce or extinguish the claim of a
creditor. See 4 W. COLLER, supra, 68.03. Recoupment, which also is used to reduce a claim,
involves the assertion of a demand by a defendant arising from the same transaction. E.g.,
In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1944); In re Tele King Corp.,
136 F. Supp. 731, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Counterclaim, on the other hand, is a much broader
device which enables a party to obtain affirmative relief. E.g., In re Monongahela Rye
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may set off a debt owed it by a bankrupt depositor against the bank-
rupt's deposits," since the deposits establish a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship between the bank and the depositor.4 Although past legis-
lative attempts to limit the bank's right to set-off have failed, 5 the
courts on occasion have devised doctrines to limit the bank's right
of set-off' in an apparent effort to achieve one of the prime objectives
of the Bankruptcy Act: equitable distribution of the bankrupt's
assets among creditors.7 In cases where the financial institution is
deeply involved in the affairs of the bankrupt and its creditors, some
courts have denied the bank's attempt to assert its set-off right by
invoking theories of equitable estoppel" or implied waiver.9 Re-
cently, however, in New Jersey National Bank v. Gutterman (In re
Applied Logic Corp.),'0 the Second Circuit expressed a reluctance
to recognize these exceptions to the set-off rule and held that a bank
which had played a major role in formulating refinancing agree-
ments with the bankrupt and other creditors and had monitored the
financial status of the bankrupt could not, without more, be denied
its right of set-off."
In re Applied Logic Corp. concerned a New Jersey-based com-
Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1944); see 4 W. COLLIER, supra, 68.03, 3 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.02 (2d ed. 1974).
2 The set-off doctrine originated in Roman law and was embodied in the earliest Ameri-
can bankruptcy laws. See generally 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, T 68.01; 3 H. REMINGTON,
supra note 1, § 1431; Lloyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (1916). For a
historical overview of bankruptcy in America, see C. WAREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY (1935).
E.g., New York County Nat'l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138 (1904); see 4 W. COLLIER,
supra note 1, T 68.16; D. CowANs, supra note 1, § 501; 3 H. REMINGTON, supra note 1, §§ 1472-
1486.
, New York County Nat'l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138 (1904); Scammon v. Kimball,
92 U.S. 362 (1875). In Massey, the Supreme Court stated that "a deposit of money upon a
general account creates. . . an ordinary debt, not a privilege or a right of a fiduciary charac-
ter." 192 U.S. at 145 (citations omitted).
See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
See note 27 and accompanying text infra.
7 Section 65a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1976), specifically provides that
the bankrupt's estate is to be divided equally among creditors. Equality among creditors has
long been recognized as a primary objective of the bankruptcy laws. See, e.g., Sampsell v.
Imperial Paper Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941). See generally 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 1,
60.01, at 743-44; see also Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931).
Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Loble, 20 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 545
(1927); see note 27 and accompanying text infra.
First Nat'l Bank v. Dudley, 231 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1956); Union Trust Co. v. Peck, 16
F.2d 986 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 767 (1927); see notes 27-29 and accompanying text
infra.if 576 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'g [1977-78 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
66,630 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'g 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 194 (Bankr. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1976).
" 576 F.2d at 960.
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puter business, Applied Logic Corporation (ALC), which owed large
sums to several creditors and banks, including New Jersey National
Bank (NJNB) .12 In an effort to rectify the ailing corporation's finan-
cial condition, ALC, NJNB and various other creditors participated
in two consecutive refinancing agreements under which ALC was
obligated to "conduct all banking of its funds at and through New
Jersey National Bank." 13 Pursuant to the second agreement, ALC's
board of directors was reorganized to give majority representation
to the non-bank creditors, and one directorship to NJNB as repre-
sentative of all the creditor-banks." ALC continued to deposit mon-
ies into a general demand checking account in NJNB. 15 When ALC
attempted to transfer a $100,000 certificate of deposit to another
bank, NJNB withdrew its vice president from the ALC board and
accelerated the corporation's debt. 6 Subsequently, NJNB set off
funds from the general account against the balance due on its unse-
cured loan to ALC. 7
In 1975, a bankruptcy proceeding was commenced in which the
validity of the bank's set-off was challenged. 8 Noting that "the right
to set off given by section 68(a) has consistently been held to be
1 Id. at 954. ALC owed a total of $1,300,000 to four banks and $2,000,000 to several
lessors of computer equipment. Id.
' Id. at 954-55.
" Id. at 955. Under the terms of the second agreement, ALC was required to report
monthly to the banks concerning the status of its accounts receivable, and "any creditor could
declare his debt to be immediately due and payable if ALC failed to meet specified cash flow
goals, if it failed to raise the full $500,000 working capital required by the agreement or under
other specified conditions." Id. In addition, a special account into which ALC was to have
made monthly payments was to be established with the New Jersey National Bank (NJNB).
The special account was never created, however, because the new board of directors decided
that it would be more expeditious to permit ALC to pay creditors directly. Id. It should be
noted that had this account been established, it probably would not have been subject to the
bank's § 68 right of set-off. For a discussion of the "special deposit" exception to the rule
permitting the set-off of bank deposits, see note 44 and accompanying text infra.
1 576 F.2d at 955. Although NJNB had the right to inquire into all withdrawals, it
exercised this right on only two or three occasions.
11 Id. at 956. When the amount of the funds deposited in the general account exceeded
$100,000, NJNB would invest the monies in its own certificates of deposit, with the approval
of ALC. Id. In June 1974, ALC requested permission to transfer a certificate of deposit to the
Princeton National Bank, which maintained the company's payroll account. Id. at 956.
'7 Id. Approximately $240,000 of ALC's deposits were set off by NJNB prior to ALC's
filing of its petition under Chapter XI, Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-399, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799
(1976). An additional $30,000 was set off after the petition had been filed.
" Id. ALC filed its petition in bankruptcy on Mar. 27, 1975 and was adjudicated a
bankrupt on Aug. 10, 1976. NJNB filed a complaint pursuant to Part VII of the Bankruptcy
Rules, 11 U.S.C. rules 701-782 (1976), seeking a declaration of the validity of a lien on ALC's
assets based upon an independently negotiated secured note. See note 26 infra. ALC answered
and counterclaimed that NJNB's set-offs were invalid under § 68a of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1976), and constituted voidable preferences under § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96
(1976).
1979]
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within the discretion of the Bankruptcy Court," the bankruptcy
court judge held that NJNB's participation in the financial affairs
of ALC was sufficient to impress the character of a trust upon the
general deposits and estop the bank from setting off those funds. 9
On appeal, the district court affirmed."
In reversing, Judge Friendly, writing for a unanimous panel,2 1
conceded that "equality among creditors [is a] dominant impulse"
in the law of bankruptcy, but observed that the "dominant im-
pulse" underlying the Bankruptcy Act's set-off provision is
"inequality among creditors. ' 22 In light of this policy, Judge
Friendly emphasized the need to be "circumspect. . . in carving
out exceptions to the express language of § 68. ' 123 Turning to the
facts, the court noted that all of the parties to the refinancing agree-
ments were "highly sophisticated extenders of credit," who could
have demanded an express waiver if it had been their intention that
NJNB refrain from exercising its right of set-off.24 Moreover, the
ambiguous testimony of one NJNB official was deemed insufficient
as a matter of law to support a finding that the other parties to the
refinancing agreements had relied to their detriment on
"assurances" that NJNB would not exercise its set-off right. I While
"1 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 199 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Dudley, 231 F.2d 396 (9th Cir.
1956)); see Cumberland Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 237 U.S. 447, 455 (1915).
2 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 66,630 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
2, Judges Mulligan and Meskill joined in the unanimous decision.
576 F.2d at 957 (citing New York County Nat'l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 148
(1904)); 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, 68.01131, at 846-48, 3 H. REMINGTON, supra note 1, §§
1434-1435.
576 F.2d at 961. The great weight of authority supports the view that the right of set-
off under § 68a is permissive rather than mandatory. See Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De
Witt, 237 U.S. 447, 455 (1915). The Cumberland Court stated that the question whether a
set-off should be allowed "is placed within the control of the bankruptcy court, which exer-
cises its discretion . . . upon the general principles of equity." Id. (citations omitted). The
Cumberland view has been followed in a great number of cases. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp.
v. Clements, 424 F.2d 673, 675 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); Tucson
House Constr. Co. v. Fulford, 378 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1967); In re Monongahela Rye Liquors,
Inc., 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1944); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 101 F.2d 441 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 583 (1939); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763 (1938); Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Co. v. Maguire, 251 F. 581 (7th
Cir. 1918).
21 576 F.2d at 961.
Id. Judge Friendly noted that the lower courts had relied largely upon the testimony
of Mr. Lynch, an NJNB official who stated that "if the agreement was put together and
signed and we didn't have a past due note at that time, we had no way to set off. So whether
we wanted to or not we couldn't." Id. at 960 n.18. Observing that Mr. Lynch's statement more
reasonably could have been interpreted by the other creditors as an indication that NJNB
intended to set off the funds when ALC's indebtedness became past due, Judge Friendly
concluded that the lower court's finding of reliance was "clearly erroneous." Id. The "clearly
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not explicitly holding that the right of set-off is "mandatory," the
court concluded that it would "require far more convincing evi-
dence" to preclude a bank from exercising its right of set-off.
26
The Applied Logic court's decision to uphold NJNB's right of
set-off, despite its deep involvement in the affairs of a financially
ailing depositor, brings the Second Circuit into direct conflict with
the position advanced by the Ninth Circuit in First National Bank
v. Dudley.2 1 Confronted with facts similar to those presented in
erroneous" standard is embodied in Bankruptcy rule 810, 11 U.S.C. rule 810 (1976), which
provides:
Upon an appeal the district court may affirm, modify, or reverse a referee's judg-
ment or order, or remand with instructions for further proceedings. The court shall
accept the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and shall give
due regard to the opportunity of the referee to judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses.
This restriction also applies when the court of appeals reviews a determination of the district
court. Smith v. Federal Land Bank, 150 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 764
(1945); Kauk v. Anderson, 137 F.2d 331, 333 (8th Cir. 1943); Morris Plan Indus. Bank v.
Henderson, 131 F.2d 975, 976 (2d Cir. 1942); FED. R. Civ. P. 52a. See generally 2 W. COLLIER,
supra note 1, 39,28.
1' 576 F.2d at 961. The court also resolved a related dispute concerning the application
of ALC's assets to the satisfaction of a secured note held by NJNB. Id. at 964-65. In 1971,
NJNB had given ALC a $100,000 loan secured by all of ALC's unencumbered assets. Id. at
955. During the bankruptcy proceedings, NJNB had claimed that $56,862.93 of the principal
of the secured loan remained unpaid. Id. at 956. Relying on a provision of one of the refinanc-
ing agreements, the bankruptcy court judge determined that, even if NJNB's set-offs were
valid, the deposits in question had to be applied first against the secured indebtedness. Id.
The effect of this determination was to minimize NJNB's total recovery against the estate of
the bankrupt. Finding that the bankruptcy court judge had "overread" the provision in the
refinancing agreement, Judge Friendly held that NJNB was within its right to apply the bank
deposits in the most advantageous manner" 'without regard to the interests of the debtor.'"
Id. at 965 (quoting 15 S. WILLISTON, LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1796 (3d ed. 1972)).
2' 231 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1956). The implied waiver doctrine, rejected in Applied Logic,
was first advanced by the Fourth Circuit in Union Trust Co. v. Peck, 16 F.2d 986 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 767 (1927). In Peck, a bank entered into agreements with several other
creditors in an effort to keep its bankrupt customer afloat. 16 F.2d at 987-88. On the basis of
these express agreements, the Fourth Circuit found an implied agreement that no party would
"do anything to secure preferential rights in or over any assets of the bankrupt." Id. at 988.
The Peck case was followed by the Ninth Circuit in Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Loble, 20
F.2d 124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 545 (1927). In Loble, the bankrupt made a special
sale of its inventory after consulting with its bank to raise sufficient funds to pay certain
creditors and to assist the bankrupt in continuing its business. The proceeds from the sale
were deposited in the depositor's general account and subsequently set off by the bank. 20
F.2d at 125. The Loble court concluded that the bank should be estopped from asserting its
right of set-off against the account since the circumstances surrounding its creation were
sufficient "to impress upon it the character of a trust fund." Id. In two subsequent cases, the
Loble decision was given a narrow interpretation. Killoren v. First Nat'! Bank, 127 F.2d 537,
543 (8th Cir. 1942); Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. Lineberger, 45 F.2d 522, 530 (4th Cir. 1930). The
doctrine, however, was reaffirmed and expanded by the Ninth Circuit in First Nat'l Bank v.
Dudley, 231 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1956).
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Applied Logic, 28 the Dudley court held that a bank which had par-
ticipated in a refinancing agreement involving the bankrupt and
other creditors may impliedly waive its set-off right and thereby be
estopped from asserting it.2 It is submitted, however, that the Sec-
ond Circuit's holding in Applied Logic represents the better view.
The primary purpose of the set-off provision in the Bankruptcy
Act is to prevent unfairness to the bankrupt's debtors, who other-
wise would be required to repay the bankrupt's estate in full while
receiving only partial satisfaction on any claims they might have
against the estate.30 Underlying this specific purpose is a more gen-
eral federal policy of encouraging the rehabilitation of faltering en-
terprises wherever possible. 1 Section 68a clearly supports this pol-
icy by encouraging banks to continue to transact business with and
extend credit to insolvent businesses without fear of losing their
ability to minimize potential losses through the exercise of the right
of set-off.32
In Dudley, a debtor negotiated an arrangement to liquidate its inventory over a 12-
month period and from the proceeds pay its bank and other creditors 10% of its debts in
monthly installments. 231 F.2d at 399. The debtor was to maintain an account with the bank
which in turn agreed to refrain from demanding immediate full payment of the monies due
it. Id. The debtor ultimately defaulted on its monthly payments, however, and the bank offset
the deposits remaining in the account. Id. at 400.
21 Id. at 402. In examining the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the
Dudley court quoted former Chief Justice Stone: " 'The court of bankruptcy is a court of
equity . . . and it is for that court . . . to define and apply federal law in determining the
extent to which the inequitable conduct of a claimant in acquiring or asserting his claim...
requires its subordination .... ' "Id. (quoting Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S.
89, 95 (1942). The Dudley majority then concluded that the facts before it justified the
application of equitable principles to deny the bank's right of set-off. 231 F.2d at 402.
" United States v. Brunner, 282 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1960); see, e.g., D. CowANs, supra
note 1, § 501 at 122.
3' See, e.g., Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 514 (1938).
32 See, e.g., Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 529 (1913); Katz v. First Nat'l
Bank, 368 F.2d 964, 972-73 (2d Cir. 1977) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Dudley, 231 F.2d
396, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1956) (Pope, J., dissenting). Recognition of the need to encourage banks
to assist faltering businesses was expressed by the Supreme Court in the Studley case.
Studley involved a challenge to a set-off exercised by a bank which had knowledge of the
bankrupt's insolvency at the time it accepted the deposits in question. 229 U.S. at 524. In
holding that the bank's set-offs were valid, the Court observed that "to deny the right of set-
off, in cases like this, would in many cases make banks hesitate to honor checks given to third
persons, would precipitate bankruptcy and so interfere with the course of business as to
produce evils of serious and far reaching consequences." Id. at 529. The same consideration
was acknowledged in the dissenting opinion in First Nat'l Bank v. Dudley, 231 F.2d 396, 404
(9th Cir. 1956) (Pope, J., dissenting):
The type of arrangement here attempted was designed to accomplish a useful
object-to get a faltering business on its feet, all to the end that ultimately all
creditors may be paid, and the owner save his business . . . . Such attempts, I
think, should be encouraged. But from now on no bank, creditor of such a debtor,
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1977 TERM
The importance of the set-off rule, particularly as it applies to
banks, was recognized as early as the 1930's, when Congress passed
comprehensive bankruptcy reform measures to address some of the
more serious economic problems arising out of the Depression.3
During the course of the legislative debates preceding the 1938 en-
actment of the Chandler Act, it was suggested that limitations be
placed on a bank's right of set-off.3 Proponents of such limitations
contended that banks enjoyed an undeservedly preferential position
among creditors. 5 The banks, however, pointed out that restrictions
on their set-off privileges might discourage them from extending
credit to financially unstable businesses and thereby defeat the re-
habilitative goals of the Act." In apparent recognition of the key role
will dare to agree to "go along," on such a plan, because if it should fail, and
bankruptcy follow, as here, the bank would risk being held to have waived its right
of set-off.
3 In 1938 major efforts to revise and modernize the bankruptcy laws culminated in the
enactment of the Chandler Act. Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 699, §§ 1-702, 52 Stat. 840.
Based upon emergency legislation enacted during the Depression, see 1 W. COLLIER, supra
note 1, 0.06, the Chandler Act revised virtually all of the rehabilitative provisions of the
bankruptcy laws and introduced the arrangement and reorganization chapters of the Act. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 500-926 (1976). See generally McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to
Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 369 (1937); Weinstein, The Debtor Relief
Chapters of the Chandler Act, 5 U. Prrr. L. REv. (1938).
" When the bill which later became the Chandler Act was originally introduced as H.R.
12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), § 68 contained three additional subdivisions affecting
banks. Proposed subdivision (d) provided:
A deposit by a bankrupt in a bank to which he is indebted at the time shall be
deemed a voidable preference if made under such circumstances that a transfer at
such time by the bankrupt to the bank would constitute a voidable preference under
this Act ....
Id. § 68(d); see 4 W. CoLLIER, supra note 1, 68.01, at 845. The effect of subdivision (d) would
have been to deprive a bank of its right of set-off against deposits made under circumstances
that would otherwise result in a voidable preference under § 60 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96
(1976). For a discussion of the distinction between bank deposits and "transfers" under § 60
of the Act, see note 42 infra. A modified version of proposed subdivision (d) subsequently was
introduced to overrule Continental & Commercial Trust & Says. Bank v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 229 U.S. 435 (1913), in which the Supreme Court held that knowledge of a deposi-
tor's insolvency does not defeat a bank's right of set-off. The proposed provision would have
limited a bank's right of set-off where a bank has acquired "reasonable cause to believe that
the bankrupt is insolvent." House Hearings on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 205-06 (1937).
See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. CHI.
L. Rav. 369 (1937); McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 583,
600-04 (1927). Professor McLaughlin argued that banks should not be permitted to profit from
deposits accepted after the bank has acquired knowledge of its customer's insolvency. See
House Hearings on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-52 (1937).
" See House Hearings on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 153-54 (1937). The banking
institutions pointed out that banks often rely on a customer's deposits as additional security
for extending credit in instances where the customer is experiencing financial difficulties. The
restrictions in the proposed subdivision, the banks argued, could seriously restrict bank
credit. Furthermore, it was noted that, unlike trade creditors whose accounts receivable often
1979]
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that banks play in the financial stability of some businesses, Con-
gress chose to leave the set-off right intact.37 Although a recent
overhaul of the federal bankruptcy statute has resulted in substan-
tial changes, 38 the right of set-off has not been significantly re-
stricted.3 1 Moreover, Congress did not incorporate the Dudley ex-
have substantial profit margins, banks receive only a small percentage of profit on each loan
they make. For this reason, the banks contended, financial institutions rely on the right of
set-off to help mitigate their losses in cases where the customer defaults. Id.
11 The proposal to limit a bank's right to set off bank deposits was deleted from the final
version of the Chandler Act, H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), before it was enacted in
1938. Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 696, §§ 1-702, 52 Stat. 840; see 1 W. COLLIER, supra
note 1, 0.07; $ 68.01 4 id., at 848.
See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3, 3-7 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 95-989; U.S. CODE]. On Oct. 1, 1979,
the substantive provisions of the revised Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549, become effective. The remaining sections which outline the new bankruptcy court
system, become effective Oct. 1, 1984. The Act represents the culmination of nearly a decade
of efforts to reform the bankruptcy laws. See S. REP. No. 95-989, supra, at 1-4, U.S. CODE at
3-7. The new set-off provision is embodied in § 553 of the Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West
Supp. Pam. 1979).
" See S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 38, at 91-92, U.S. CODE at 93-94; H.R. REP. No.
95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 184-86 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
179, 363-65 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 95-595, U.S. CODE]. The status of the set-off
right under the Act of 1978 is described in S. REP. No. 95-989 as follows:
[tihe [set-off] section states that the right of set-off is unaffected by the [new]
bankruptcy code except to the extent that the creditor's claim is disallowed, the
creditor acquired (other than from the debtor) the claim during the 90 days preced-
ing the case while the debtor was insolvent, the debt being offset was incurred for
the purpose of obtaining a right of set-off, while the debtor was insolvent and during
the 90-day prebankruptcy period, or the creditor improved his position in the 90-
day period . . . . Only the last exception is an addition to current law.
Id. at 91-92, U.S. CODE at 93-94.
The new limitation on the set-off right as it appears in § 553 precludes banks from setting
off deposits of insolvent customers made within a 90-day period preceding the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy, to the extent that such deposits increase the amount in the account
to a level in excess of that which existed immediately before the commencement of the 90-
day period. 11 U.S.C.A. § 553(b) (West Supp. Pam. 1979); see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra,
at 184-86, U.S. CODE at 361-63.
It should be noted that there is some indication that the redefined "transfer" term, 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(40) (West Supp. Pam. 1979), of the Act of 1978 is intended to embrace "bank
deposits." See S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 38, at 27, U.S. CODE at 29. So defined, bank
deposits would seemingly be subject to scrutiny under the new section addressing voidable
preferences. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West Supp. Pam. 1979); see note 42 infra. Thus, a long line
of cases which held that bank deposits do not constitute transfers under the bankruptcy laws
apparently would be overruled. See, e.g., Katz v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 968, 971 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); note 42 infra. Although this change could be viewed
as an indication of Congress' intent to limit the bank's right of set-off, a contrary intent-to
continue encouraging banks to assist faltering businesses and impose only minimal new
limitations on the set-off right - was expressed in the final House Report on the Act of 1978.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra, at 184-86, U.S. CODE at 361-63. In addition, since § 547,
the new voidable preferences provision appears to be inapplicable to transfers made "in the
ordinary course of business," 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. Pam. 1979); see S. REp.
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ception in the new set-off provision and, in addition, expressed its
desire to continue encouraging banks to assist faltering businesses. 0
It should be noted that, even in the absence of the "implied
waiver" theory applied in Dudley,4' the set-off doctrine has several
built-in limitations to prevent a bank from abusing its set-off privi-
lege.4" For example, the courts have distinguished deposits in gen-
No. 95-989, supra note 38, at 87, U.S. CODE at 90, it is arguable that Congress intended to
confine any new limitations imposed upon a bank's right to set-off to those embodied in §
553.
4, See note 39 supra. Many courts and commentators have advanced the view that the
set-off right should not be impaired. One noted commentator has stated that "the prevailing
[set-off] doctrine is practical, [and] commercial good sense supports it." 4 W. COLLIER,
supra note 1, 68.16, at 921-22; see 2 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYENCEs AND PREFERENCES
§ 407 (rev. ed. 1940) (citing Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523 (1913)). In addition,
§ 68a has been described as "eminently just and increasingly favored in courts of bank-
ruptcy, because of its essential fairness." In re W. & A. Bacon Co., 261 F. 109, 111 (D. Mass.
1919).
" See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
42 Additionally, under narrowly defined circumstances, bank deposits may be deemed
"transfers" voidable under the provision of the Bankruptcy Act addressing preferences. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976). See, e.g., Katz v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 968 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). Section 60, the general policing section, permits
certain claims acquired by creditors against the bankrupt's estate to be voided as preferential
transfers. The Act defines transfers to include "the sale and every other and different mode,
direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property, or with an interest therein."
Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976). In New York County Nat'l Bank v. Massey,
192 U.S. 138 (1904), the Supreme Court held that general bank deposits do not constitute
transfers. Since the statutory definition of "transfers, of property . . . contemplate[s] the
parting with the bankrupt's property for the benefit of the creditor and the consequent
diminution of the bankrupt's estate," id. at 147, the Massey Court reasoned that a bank
deposit, which does not deplete the depositor's estate, cannot be considered a "transfer." Id.;
accord, Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523 (1913). Although Massey was decided
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, its holding has been followed by courts construing the
modern statutes. E.g., Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1975); Farmers Bank v.
Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); Cusick v. Second Nat'l
Bank, 115 F.2d 150, 151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
While § 60 does not generally affect a bank's right to set-off because of the requirement
that there be a transfer, if the deposit is made with the intention that it be applied against
an antecedent debt it will be considered a transfer within the meaning of the Act. Under such
circumstances, the deposit may be deemed a voidable preference and thus unavailable for
set-off. See, e.g., Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 446 (1901); Katz v. First
Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 968, 971 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). In Katz, the
Second Circuit apparently expanded the scope of this rule by holding that a deposit intended
by the depositor as payment on an antecedent debt may constitute a transfer even if the bank
did not know of the depositor's intent. 568 F.2d at 971.
In addition to meeting the "transfer" requirement, however, a transaction must satisfy
five other statutory prerequisites to constitute a voidable preference under § 60. In Mayo v.
Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959), the six elements of § 60a were
described as follows:
(1) [T]here must be a transfer of the debtor's property (2) to or for the benefit
of a creditor (3) for or on account of an antecedent debt (4) the transfer must be
made or suffered while the debtor is insolvent (5) within four months of bankruptcy
1979]
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eral accounts from deposits placed in "special accounts. 4 3 Where
deposits are dedicated to a special purpose that is known to the
bank, the deposits may be deemed to be held in trust." Under these
circumstances, the requirement of "mutuality" of debts and cred-
its" is not satisfied and the deposits are unavailable to the bank for
set-off. 6 Additionally, the Bankruptcy Act itself limits the availa-
bility of the doctrine by disallowing the set-off of claims purchased
or transferred subsequent to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy,
or within 4 months thereof if the transaction was made "with a view
to such use and with knowledge or notice that such bankrupt was
insolvent or had committed an act of bankruptcy."47
It is suggested that the approach taken by the Applied Logic
court is more desirable than that advanced by the Ninth Circuit in
Dudley. In Applied Logic, the Second Circuit correctly suggested
that notions of equitable distribution should be deemphasized in
cases involving bank set-offs. Since the decision encourages banks
to assist faltering businesses, it is consistent with the strong federal
policy favoring rehabilitation rather than liquidation.
Gregory J. O'Connell
and (6) the effect of the transfer must be to enable the creditor to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than another creditor of the same class.
Id. at 834-35 (emphasis added).
" Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Loble, 20 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 545
(1927). Generally, there is a presumption that deposits are general rather than special. See
In re Cross, 273 F. 29 (2d Cir. 1921); White v. Pacific-Southwest Trust & Says. Bank, 9 F.2d
650, 658 (S.D. Cal. 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 15 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1926); 10 AM. JUR. 2d
Banks § 363 (1963).
1, See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1967); Union Bank & Trust
Co. v. Loble, 20 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 545 (1927).
' See note 1 supra.
" See 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 1, 68.16, at 913.
" Bankruptcy Act § 68b, 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2) (1976); see Western Tie & Timber Co.
v. Brown, 196 U.S. 502 (1905); In re Merchandise Mart, 79 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.S.C. 1948). A
major distinction between preferences voidable under § 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976),
and the invalidating of set-offs under § 68b, 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2) (1976), is that "intent"
to acquire a preferential position is an element of the latter, but not the former. See Katz v.
First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 964, 970 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Gold-
stein v. Franklin Square Nat'l Bank, 107 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1939). One commentator has stated
that "Itihe principal object of ... § 68(b) is to prevent debtors of the bankrupt from
acquiring claims against him for use by way of set-off and reduction of their indebtedness to
the estate." 4 W. CoLLIER, supra note 1, 68.12, at 903. The other limitations imposed by §
68b are discussed in note 1 supra. See generally Continental & Commercial Says. Bank v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 229 U.S. 435 (1912).
